Decentralized crypto-currencies based on the blockchain architecture cannot scale to thousands of transactions per second. We define an architecture, called the blockclique, that addresses this limitation by sharding transactions into a block graph with a fixed number of threads. A block in a given thread only contains transactions with input addresses assigned to this thread, and references one previous block of each thread as parents. The architecture reaches 6,000 transactions per second and an average transaction time of 2 minutes in our simulations.
Introduction
A decentralized crypto-currency is a currency built upon an open peer-to-peer network of computers sharing a ledger matching addresses with their respective balances, and executing transactions to exchange digital coins between addresses. The use of cryptographic functions allows authentication and prevents the theft or duplication of digital coins, therefore removing the need for central minting, processing and regulation authorities that traditional currencies require. Bitcoin, launched in 2009, was the first decentralized crypto-currency to appear [12] . Some decentralized crypto-currencies also allow the execution of custom programs called smart contracts, that are stored and act on the ledger (e.g. Ethereum [2] ), so that advanced operations involving multiple agents can be processed.
In a decentralized crypto-currency, any computer (or node) can join the network at any time, fetch from peers and verify the list of all executed transactions, create and broadcast new candidate transactions that can include transaction fees, or execute sets of incoming candidate transactions by gathering one or more of them into a block and broadcasting the block, potentially winning the associated transaction fees in the process. However, when nodes are processing large numbers of transactions, they may not all manage to download and verify the latest transactions executed by other nodes, and reaching a consensus about which transactions are considered executed can become harder. The rate of blocks that each node is allowed to broadcast can be capped by the protocol, however this cap does not prevent malicious actors from tampering with transaction consensus by creating and controlling thousands of nodes, which is called a Sybil attack.
To regulate transaction execution rate, decentralized protocols perform a Sybil-resistant random selection of nodes that generate blocks in a timely manner. Bitcoin uses Proof-of-Work (PoW) selection where nodes perform heavy computational operations called mining, until they create by chance a block of transactions with a hash below a given target integer. A difficulty regulation mechanism adjusts the target according to the total mining power of the network to ensure that nodes create blocks at a desired average rate. The Sybilresistance of PoW arises from the fact that if an agent divides its mining power between several nodes, its total mining power, and therefore its probability of creating a block, remains unchanged. Another random selection mechanism used by several protocols (e.g. Tezos [8] ) is Proof-of-Stake (PoS). PoS randomly selects an address allowing its owner node to produce a block of transactions at a given time, with a probability proportional to the the amount of digital coins the address holds. As splitting coins between various addresses and nodes does not increase overall selection probability, PoS is Sybil-resistant as well, with the added advantage of lower power consumption.
When a node is selected, it is allowed to execute candidate transactions by appending a block of transactions to a local data structure defined by the protocol, and broadcast the block to other nodes that further propagate it. The most commonly used data structure is the blockchain, in which each block also contains the hash of a previous block (its "parent" block). The resulting data structure is a block tree, with a single parent-less "genesis" block.
Communication latency between network peers can result in different nodes having received different, and potentially incompatible sets of executed transactions. Protocol-defined consensus rules are therefore required in addition to the Sybil-resistant selection and data structure, to ensure a network-wide agreement on executed transactions. The Nakamoto consensus rule states that when two blocks sharing the same parent are encountered, only the transactions of the block within the branch of highest total work under PoW, or highest total stake under PoS, should be considered executed. As a result, nodes tend to prevent long-lived forks by extending a single common branch of the block tree: the blockchain.
Small block sizes and low block frequencies (1 MB every 10 minutes on average for Bitcoin) ensure that most blocks propagate to the whole network before new blocks are broadcast, therefore keeping the fork rate low and the consensus effective. However, such parameters also limit the transaction throughput (5 transactions per second for Bitcoin), causing congestion that forces users to spend high transaction fees for their transactions to be processed before others. Blockchain-based crypto-currencies thus face important scalability issues [3] .
Recently, there have been several attempts at scaling decentralized cryptocurrencies through changes in data structures and consensus rules [3] . One line of work studies transaction sharding, which consists in distributing nodes and transactions into several groups ("shards") that run in parallel. In Elastico [11] and OmniLedger [9] , a PoW challenge allows miners to generate an identity that assigns them to a random shard. Miners from a shard agree on a set of transac-tions to commit from their shard, and random ensembles of nodes agree to merge the transactions committed by the different shards. However, the Elastico consensus process is slow, resulting in slow transactions execution, and has consensus failures. In OmniLedger, the benefits of sharding are lost when transactions involve more than one shard, which naturally occurs in peer-to-peer transactions. In Bitcoin-NG [5] , a leader is elected on a regular basis by PoW, and decides which transactions to include in the blockchain, and Zilliqa [17] builds upon Bitcoin-NG by adding sharding. However, all of these protocols require nodes of different shards to eventually agree on a common blockchain, which limits the parallelism benefits of sharding.
Another line of work seeks to extend the block tree structure into a block graph structure. The first directed acyclic block graph (block DAG) structures appear in [16] and [10] . In SPECTRE [15] , blocks are ordered in a block DAG but transactions of one block can be incompatible with transactions from other blocks as transactions are not sharded. An extra voting process is required to order transactions and choose which ones are executed. In IOTA [13] , transactions are included in a directed acyclic graph of transactions (called the tangle), which is not sharded. To emit a new transaction, a node attaches it to two other tip transactions of its local transaction DAG, solves a simple PoW scheme and broadcasts the transaction. Consequently, there are no miners, blocks are reduced to a single transaction and there is no Sybil-resistant time regulation mechanism. Moreover, a centralized node (called coordinator) run by the IOTA foundation provides checkpoints every minute so that nodes consistently verify transactions in the tangle, and so that the DAG width does not grow excessively in width.
Existing attempts at solving the blockchain scaling problem therefore either suffer from intricate and slow multi-step consensus algorithms, are unsafe, or not fully decentralized. This paper defines a data structure called the blockclique, which is the first to include transaction sharding within a directed acyclic block graph structure, and the corresponding blockclique consensus rule allowing increased transaction throughputs. The blockclique achieves transaction sharding by deterministically assigning each block of transactions to a specific "thread" from a fixed number of threads, according to the input addresses of the enclosed transactions. Transactions in a block can have multiple input addresses from the same thread, and multiple outputs to addresses from any thread without interfering with consensus efficiency: valid transactions involving different threads are compatible by construction. Each block contains the hash of one parent block in each thread, which generates a multithreaded directed acyclic block graph. The width of the block DAG is fixed by the constant number of threads, which naturally constrains the DAG to grow in one direction. The blockclique consensus rule defines the best clique of compatible blocks (the blockclique), which allows a block produced in a thread to be compatible with a block produced in another thread at the same time, therefore scaling up the rate of compatible blocks and transactions that can be exchanged in the network while keeping the fork rate low, and without the need for extra merging steps nor central authorities. The blockclique therefore extends the blockchain data structure, and the blockclique consensus rule adapts the Nakamoto consensus rule. Moreover, the blockclique architecture is compatible with any Sybil-resistant time-regulated random selection mechanism, such as PoW or PoS.
After defining the blockclique data structure and consensus rule, we simulate nodes that implement the blockclique architecture and interact in a peer-to-peer network. By studying the effects of known and projected attacks, and evaluating network statistics under various settings, we define blockclique parameters that offer reasonable performance and security. We show that the blockclique architecture reaches 6, 000 transactions per second with an average transaction time of 2 minutes in a PoW setting. We also simulate the architecture under different network conditions to evaluate its robustness. Finally, we discuss our results and provide future research directions.
Blockclique Architecture
Improving transaction throughput over traditional blockchains can be achieved by allowing nodes to produce compatible blocks in parallel. In the blockclique architecture, nodes can produce blocks in a fixed number of threads. With a PoW random node selection mechanism, nodes choose in which thread they produce blocks (random by default), however a PoS mechanism can specify in which random thread a node is allowed to produce each block. To ensure that transactions in a block are compatible with all other transactions in blocks discovered in other threads, we dedicate each thread to a distinct subset of transactions, based on the input address of the transactions. This process, called transaction sharding, prevents an address from spending its coins in two different threads, as it could lead to a double spend. For instance, if there are 32 threads, then the first 5 bits of an address define the thread in which the address can use its coins as input of a transaction. On the contrary, transaction output can be any address, regardless of the thread of the input addresses. However, high transaction throughputs make the history of transactions grow quickly, and nodes need to be able to forget part of the oldest blocks to save space. The nodes also need to store the balance of each address, so that they can verify any transaction by checking if the input address has enough coins, without the need to lookup old transactions. Transactions contain a signed timestamp, allowing nodes to avoid including old, or duplicated transactions. We give in Appendix B a detailed implementation of the minimal data that must be stored in transactions and blocks to be able to validate transactions and apply the consensus rule. In Appendix C we evaluate the computing, network and storage requirements depending on the blockclique parameters and show that the high transaction throughput can be reached with fair and balanced requirements. The next sections formalize the multithreaded block graph structure and the blockclique consensus rule. Fig. 1 . Example of a multithreaded directed acyclic block graph, with 8 parallel threads and one block created every 32 s on average in each thread. We plot blocks currently in the blockclique in blue, and blocks not in the blockclique in orange. The first 8 blocks are the genesis blocks. Blue arrows denote links from a parent block to a child block. The links to the last created block are in bold.
A Multithreaded Block DAG
We define T as the number of threads, and each thread is identified by a number τ , from thread τ = 0 to thread τ = T − 1. Each block is identified by its hash: b τ h denotes the block with hash h in thread τ . We define one genesis block per thread, that we denote b τ 0 . Each non-genesis block must reference one parent block in each thread (using the parent block's hash). We define the parent function P (b τ2 h2 , τ 1 ) → b τ1 h1 that gives the parent b τ1 h1 in thread τ 1 of a non-genesis block b τ2 h2 . The parent function generates a block graph G where an arrow from b τ1 h1 to b τ2 h2 means that P (b τ2 h2 , τ 1 ) = b τ1 h1 . As each block references its parents' hashes, and the hashing procedure of a block takes into account those hashes, it is cryptographically impossible to build a cycle in this graph. G is therefore a directed acyclic graph (DAG) of parallel blocks.
A block DAG is a multithreaded block DAG if non-genesis blocks are well formed: they reference one block of each thread, and an ancestor b τ h in a thread τ of a block b τ2 h2 must be P (b τ2 h2 , τ ) or one of its ancestors. We define the generation function g τ that gives the generation of a block b τ h in thread τ as the length of the only path in G between genesis block b τ 0 and b τ h going only through blocks in thread τ . We also define the Path(G, b τ1 h1 , b τ2 h2 ) predicate, being true if there is a directed path in G between b τ1 h1 and b τ2 h2 or if b τ1 h1 = b τ2 h2 . Fig. 1 shows an example of a multithreaded block DAG.
Blockclique Rule
When a node receives a block from its peers, it first checks that the block is valid (see Appendix B.2). It then uses the blockclique rule to decide which valid blocks it takes into account to produce a new block. The intuitions behind the blockclique rule are the following: on the first hand, each thread of blocks behaves like a standard blockchain where two blocks in a same thread can not have the same parent in that thread (thread incompatibility), and on the other hand, rather than acting as if their thread was independent, nodes are incentivised to take into account blocks found in other threads by an extra rule called grandpa incompatibility.
We define the thread incompatibility graph G T I as the graph with one node per valid block, and an undirected edge between two blocks b τ1 h1 and b τ2 h2 only if those two blocks are non-genesis blocks in the same thread and have the same parent in their thread:
See Fig. 1 for an example of a thread incompatibility, between blocks 15 and 17, that both have block 10 as parent in their thread. We then define the grandpa incompatibility graph G GP I as the graph with one node per valid block, and an undirected edge between two blocks b τ1 h1 and b τ2 h2 if the parent of block b τ2 h2 in thread τ 1 is not the parent of b τ1 h1 or one of its descendants in τ 1 and the parent of block b τ1 h1 in thread τ 2 is not the parent of b τ2 h2 or one of its descendants in τ 2 :
The grandpa incompatibility is a topological way of saying that a block b τ h in thread τ should not be included if it does not take into account the blocks that were found in other threads before the time when P (b τ h , τ ) was found, but without checking block timestamps which can be inaccurate or manipulated. Appendix A includes an example of grandpa incompatibility.
From those thread and grandpa incompatibility graphs G T I and G GP I , we define the compatibility graph G C as the graph with one node per valid block, and an undirected edge between two blocks b τ1 h1 and b τ2 h2 if those two blocks are not thread nor grandpa incompatible, and b τ1 h1 is compatible with the parents of b τ2 h2 , and b τ2 h2 is compatible with the parents of b τ1 h1 :
The definition of G C is recursive: G C is built incrementally following a topological order of G, by processing a block as soon as all its parents have been received and processed. Let cliques(G C ) be the set of maximal cliques of compatible blocks: the set of subsets C of blocks of G C such that every two distinct blocks of C are adjacent in G C and the addition of any block breaks this property. We also define the work sum of a clique, worksum(C), as the sum of the inverse of the targets of all block in C, and the hash sum of a clique, hashsum(C), as the sum of the hashes of all blocks in C. The blockclique rule states that the best compatible block clique, the blockclique, is the clique of compatible blocks of maximum work sum, and if tie, of minimum block hash sum:
Incremental Cliques and Finality
As finding the maximum cliques of a graph is NP-hard, the blockclique of the whole graph G cannot be efficiently computed once G has more than a few hundred blocks. We thus define an incremental rule for recomputing the cliques with only the most recent blocks. In practice, an incremental subgraph G IN CR of G is kept in memory and updated by adding new valid blocks, and removing blocks that can be considered stale or final. Blocks that are only in cliques of G C that have a size smaller or equal to the size of the blockclique minus a finality parameter F , are considered stale, and can be removed from G IN CR . Blocks that are common to all maximal cliques of G C and have more than F descendants in at least one clique, are considered final and can be removed from G IN CR as well. We also define incremental versions of G T I , G GP I and G C by keeping the same nodes as in G IN CR . The finality parameter F represents the lag with respect to the size of the blockclique from which an alternative clique is removed. With this definition, if an alternative clique has more blocks than the blockclique minus F , it still has a chance to survive if a majority of the nodes coordinate to switch to that clique. Consequently, the finality parameter F must be chosen high enough so that the probability that an alternative clique behind the blockclique by F − 1 blocks overtakes the blockclique is very low, even if attackers have a non-negligible part of the mining power (PoW) or stake (PoS). On the other hand, if F is too high, G C becomes large, and nodes need a long time to recompute the cliques each time they receive a block. F must therefore be chosen carefully as a tradeoff between security and efficiency. See Sec. 3.1 for more details on this question.
We define the average time between two final blocks in each thread as t f 0 . We denote t v 0 the average time if all valid blocks, including stale blocks are considered, so that if s is the proportion of stale blocks, we have t v 0 = t f 0 (1 − s).
Security Analysis
In order to ensure the security of the blockclique architecture, it is necessary to evaluate its robustness against a wide range of possible attacks. These security considerations define safety limits to the parameters of the architecture.
Replay Attack
Assuming an honest majority, most of the mining or staking power is dedicated to the blockclique. Any other smaller clique has a high probability of becoming more than F blocks shorter than the blockclique, in which case its blocks that are not in other, sufficiently larger cliques, are considered stale. However, the network latency t 1/2 , which corresponds to the time needed to broadcast a block to more than half of the peers, can reach a few seconds [4] . Since here new blocks typically appear every second, different nodes end up receiving blocks in different orders. Consequently, one node can decide that a given block is stale because it is only in cliques that are F blocks or more smaller than the blockclique, while another node, having received one more descendant of this block would not consider it stale yet. If an alternative clique containing a block that is considered stale by some but not all of the nodes gets extended and catches up with the blockclique, then the nodes that considered the block as stale reject the blocks of the new blockclique and the network forks. In order to avoid such forks, F ×t f 0 T must be high with respect to the network latency t 1/2 .
We conservatively choose
As a consequence, attackers with a non-negligible share of the total mining or staking power can coordinate to switch to an alternative clique F − 1 blocks shorter than the blockclique from the point of view of some nodes, and F blocks shorter from the point of view of others, and extend this alternative clique until it overtakes the blockclique, in order to fork the network. This attack is called the replay attack. The finality parameter F must therefore be high enough so that this attack has a very low probability to succeed, even if the attackers have a large share of the total power. For instance, with F = 64 blocks and attackers controlling 30% of the power, the success probability of the attack is 10 −16 if the stale rate is 25% (see Appendix D). We therefore recommend keeping F high enough so that F ≥ 64 and F ×t f 0 T ≥ 64 s. However, if F is much larger, the incremental compatibility graph contains a large number of blocks, and the time needed to recompute cliques is larger. For instance, F = 64 blocks is a reasonable security-speed trade-off when T = 32 and t f 0 = 32 s.
Transaction Finality
In the blockclique architecture, a transaction becomes final once a block that contains it becomes final and is removed from the incremental graph. This happens when the block belongs to all maximal cliques of the compatibility graph and has more than F descendants in at least one clique. Once a block is final, any new block incompatible with it ends in a clique more than F blocks shorter than the blockclique, and is thus immediately considered stale by honest nodes. When speed is favored over security, typically for low-cost transactions, it is possible to wait less than F blocks to consider the transaction confirmed with high probability. Indeed, one can check that the transaction is included in a block of the blockclique, and wait for cliques that do not contain the transaction to become e.g. 16 blocks shorter than the blockclique. While the probability of the blockclique being overtaken by a clique that does not contain the transaction remains very low (see Appendix D with F = 16 blocks), the total transaction time can drop from 126 s to about 60 s in a network with T = 32, t v 0 = 32 s, F = 64 blocks and U = 32 Mbps (see Appendix F.1).
Imbalance Attack
With the blockclique architecture with a PoW random selection mechanism, the mining power is spread across multiple threads, and miners are free to choose one or several threads in which they mine blocks. The default behavior we define is to mine in a single thread at a time, and regularly hop to a random thread. Miners with more resources can mine in several, or even all threads at the same time if their transaction processing power and network capacity allow it.
If attackers with a large proportion of the total mining power coordinate to focus their mining efforts into a single thread, the mining power can become imbalanced between threads. Attackers reaching a large majority of the mining power in one specific thread can mine normal blocks, or exclude some or all transactions from the blocks they create.
We simulate the consequences of attackers mining normal blocks depending on the attackers' power (see Appendix F.4). For instance, when T = 32, t v 0 = 32 s and when the network is saturated (honest blocks are full), with the attackers' total mining proportion being 3%, 10% and 20%, the attackers' final block rate per unit of mining power is respectively 29.8, 33.4 and 34.6 b/h, and their final transactions rate is 43.0, 19.9 and 11.3 tx/s. By contrast, the rate of final blocks of honest miners is 28.6, 29.2 and 30.0 b/h and their rate of final transactions is 61.3, 62.2 and 64.1 tx/s. These simulations show that, as the attackers' mining power proportion increases, the rate of attacker blocks becoming final per unit of mining power slightly increases, while their final transaction rate largely decreases. The cost of the attack thus depends on the relative value of transaction fees and block rewards. However, the final block and transaction rates of honest miners that switch threads regularly increases noticeably.
In the case attackers exclude some or all transactions, those transactions are still included by the honest miners of the thread. The attack can increase stale rates, but transactions continue being processed almost at their normal rate.
Selfish Mining Attack
In single-thread blockchains based on a Proof-of-Work random selection, attackers with a large share of the total mining power can secretly mine a chain of blocks, only disclosing blocks one by one when honest nodes are about to catch up [6, 14] . This Selfish Mining attack can cause honest nodes of the network to spend non-negligible time mining blocks that have a higher-than-usual probability of becoming stale, thus further reducing the mining efficiency of honest miners, while further increasing that of the attackers.
In the blockclique architecture, selfish attackers can more easily reach a majority of the mining power in a specific thread. However, the grandpa incompatibility rule (Section 2.2) forces honest miners to take into account blocks from all threads as soon as they observe and verify them, and extend the clique of maximum work. As a result, selfish miners that dominate a given thread still compete against the total mining power of the network, and the Selfish Mining attack remains at least as hard as in single-threaded blockchains. Furthermore, the blockclique consensus rule forces all miners to choose the clique with the minimum hash sum, and thus one particular block of two alternative incompatible blocks, which mitigates Selfish Mining attacks to some extent.
Network Simulations to Evaluate Blockclique Efficiency
The security, usability and performance of the blockclique architecture depend on its parameters and vary according to network properties. In order to evaluate the network performance and choose appropriate parameters under realistic conditions, we simulate an ensemble of N nodes randomly connected in a peerto-peer network that discover and exchange blocks, emit about 8000 transactions per second, and compute the blockclique following the rules defined in Section 2 in the context of a Proof-of-Work selection mechanism. Events in the network such as block or message emission and reception are processed in chronological order. Each node mines in a particular thread, and nodes are evenly spread across threads. Every time a node receives a new block, it recomputes the blockclique and includes new transactions. The time a node takes to discover a block is simulated using an exponential law so that the average time between two blocks in each thread is t v 0 , which approximates difficulty-based regulation. The maximum block size is chosen according to t v 0 and the number of threads T to allow 8000 transactions to be included in blocks every second. The simulations 16 32 64 Stale Rate (%) are stopped when 3600 blocks are created, and the finality parameter is set to F = 64 blocks. To ensure consistency, every simulation is performed 10 times with different random seeds (See Appendix E for the full details of our methods). The Python code for these simulations is open-source 1 .
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Number of threads and inter-block interval
The number of threads T that defines the parallelization level of the architecture, and the average time between blocks t v 0 that defines how fast blocks are appended, are both important parameters of the blockclique architecture. In order to evaluate their influence, we simulate N = 1024 nodes across T = 16, 32, 64 threads with inter-block times t v 0 = 16, 32, 64 s, and average network upload bandwidth U = 32 Mbps and latency L = 100 ms. Figure 2 (a) shows the average transaction throughput computed as the number of transactions included in the blockclique over the whole simulation and divided by the total simulation time. Figure 2 (b) shows the average block stale rate: the proportion of stale blocks among stale and final blocks.
The results show that the average throughput increases and the stale rate decreases with the number of threads, for all three values of t v 0 . For instance, with t v 0 = 32 s, the average throughput is 5635, 6285, and 6577 tx/s and the stale rate is 27.3%, 19.4%, and 13.0% for T = 16, T = 32 and T = 64 respectively (with U = 32 Mbps, see Appendix F for complementary results). When we increase the number of threads, the overall block frequency increases, and we decrease the block size. For instance, with t v 0 = 32 s, there is one block of 2 MB every 2 seconds with T = 16 threads and 2 blocks of 500 kB per second with T = 64 threads. The parallel structure of the blockclique allows to produce large amounts of small blocks that are broadcast faster, which explains the lower stale rate and higher transaction throughput obtained with a higher number of threads. The average transaction throughput also increases and the stale rate decreases with the time between two blocks t v 0 . For T = 32 threads, the average throughput is 6017, 6285, and 6424 tx/s and the stale rate is 22.7%, 19.4%, and 17.3% at t v 0 = 16, t v 0 = 32, and t v 0 = 64 s respectively. Indeed, a slower block rate in each thread gives more time to blocks to be broadcast before the next block creation, resulting in a lower stale rate and thus a higher throughput.
Together with the safety limits defined in Section 3, these results suggest that a blockclique architecture with T = 32 threads, and t v 0 = 32 s leads to a reasonable and robust trade-off between speed, performance and security.
Network properties
The number of active nodes, as well as the network bandwidth and latency are important factors that drive the performance of consensus protocols [7] . In order to evaluate their influence on the blockclique architecture, we perform simulations to obtain the transaction throughput for various numbers of nodes N , upload bandwidths U , and network latencies L. Figure 3 (a), obtained with L = 100 ms, shows that the throughput decreases with the number of nodes, but remains high even in large networks. For instance, with U = 32 Mbps, and N = 256, 1024, 4096 nodes, the average throughput is 6750, 6285 and 5923 tx/s respectively. This result shows that the blockclique architecture scales to networks with thousands of nodes without substantial performance degradation. Figure 3 (b), obtained for N = 1024 nodes, shows that the transaction throughput also slightly decreases when the network latency between connected peers increases: with U = 32 Mbps, it is 6361, 6285 and 6165 tx/s for L = 50, 100 and 150 ms respectively. Finally, both figures show that the transaction throughput substantially increases with the upload bandwidth. For instance, with 1024 nodes, the average throughput with U = 32, 64 and 128 Mbps is respectively 6285, 6997 and 7232 tx/s. Overall, these results show that the blockclique architecture scales to large networks, and highlight its robustness under a wide range of realistic network bandwidths and latencies.
Discussion
The blockclique architecture combines three main ideas that together make scaling possible: 1) transaction sharding, where transactions are separated into multiple threads based on their input address so that two blocks of different threads created at the same time can be compatible, 2) a multithreaded block directed acyclic graph structure, where each block references one previous block of each thread, and 3) representing transactions as a value moved from one address to another and storing the balance of each address to allow forgetting old blocks.
The architecture specifies elementary rules so that nodes agree on which blocks become final: the thread incompatibility rule states that two blocks of a thread cannot have the same parent in their thread which would be equivalent to a fork in a blockchain, the grandpa incompatibility rule pushes nodes to take into account the blocks discovered in other threads, and the blockclique rule defines the blockclique as the clique of compatible blocks of maximum work sum, and if tie, of minimum hash sum. The blockclique architecture guarantees by construction that no double-spend can happen, and works in principle with any Sybil-resistant time-regulated random node selection mechanism such as Proof-of-Work or Proof-of-Stake, although parts of the consensus rule may need to be adapted to the specifics of the time regulation.
We investigated the security of the blockclique architecture against replay attacks, imbalance attacks, and selfish mining attacks, showing its safety within a conveniently broad range of architecture parameters.
In order to evaluate the blockclique architecture, we implemented an opensource simulation of the interaction of nodes in a random peer-to-peer network with a Proof-of-Work setting, that discover blocks, ask and send blocks to peers, and compute the blockclique based on the blocks they received. We have chosen parameters to use the maximum of today's fair storage capacity, network connectivity and computation capacity at the same time. With those settings, we then varied the number of threads T and the time between blocks t v 0 to evaluate different blockclique structure parameters, and we also experimented different ranges of average network bandwidth and latency starting from estimates of the connectivity in Bitcoin and Ethereum networks.
Our simulations show that when we increase the number of threads up to T = 32 threads, the average transaction throughput reaches more than 6000 txps, assuming an average upload bandwidth of nodes of U = 32 Mbps. However, the number of threads T is further increased, the time between blocks or the finality parameter also needs to be increased to keep the same level of security, e.g.
F ×t f 0 T ≥ 64 s, which has the adverse effect of increasing the average transaction time. With T = 32 threads, a time between blocks t v 0 = 32 s and a finality F = 64, the total transaction time is 126 seconds assuming an average upload bandwidth of 32 Mbps. Interestingly, even if the finality parameter is set to F = 64 blocks to achieve high security, low-cost transactions can still be confirmed with high probability after waiting a shorter confirmation time.
Further simulations have shown that the blockclique architecture successfully scales to thousands of nodes and wide ranges of realistic network bandwidth and latency values without significant performance degradation. However, to increase even more the maximum transaction throughput we would need to assume a higher average network bandwidth, e.g. above 128 Mbps. If the average bandwidth improves over the years, the block size can be increased to some extent, e.g. to 2 MB (for T = 32 threads and t v 0 = 32 s). However, further increasing the block size may require matching improvements in computational power and storage space.
Our results together show that the decentralized blockclique architecture, through the parallel discovery of blocks in parallel threads, scales to a high transaction throughput with a low average transaction time, even in large networks of nodes while staying safe against common attacks. By producing for instance one block reward per second, the blockclique architecture also reduces the incentive for miners to pool, which further protects decentralization.
These simulations define suitable ranges of parameters for the blockclique architecture, however an effective implementation in a real network is needed to optimize the parameters in real-life conditions and without approximations. For instance, we do not simulate the transmission of unconfirmed transactions between nodes, which may consume as much bandwidth as block transmission. However, if nodes only download transactions from the thread in which they plan to mine (with proof-of-work) or in which they are selected to produce a block (with proof-of-stake), the bandwidth necessary for sharing unconfirmed transactions is much lower. Also, we did not implement block targets and assumed that all honest miners have the same constant mining power. However, variations on the mining power or stake of nodes are expected to have little effects on the global transaction throughput and stale rate as nodes are choosing or are selected to produce blocks in random threads.
We simulated a blockclique with a Proof-of-Work random node selection mechanism, where nodes can choose the thread in which they want to produce new blocks. PoW therefore allows miners to coordinate to unbalance the mining power in each thread, which we call an imbalance attack and show that it has a limited impact (see Appendix F.4). However, a Proof-of-Stake mechanism could select for each block to be produced both a random stake and a random thread, so that nodes could not manipulate the thread in which their stake allows them to produce a block. PoW mechanisms also have the drawback that miners buy more computing power to get more rewards in a competition for the highest mining power proportion which wastes energy, estimated for instance in the Bitcoin network to be somewhere between 1 and 10 GW for about 50 × 10 18 hashes.
Another important use of blockchains is the processing of smart contracts, for example within the Ethereum platform [2] . With the blockclique however, transaction sharding requires that the contracts processed through a transaction in a particular thread only reduce the balance of addresses from this particular thread. In a high-throughput architecture, old blocks and transactions can be forgotten and contracts must be able to operate only with their stored data. Finally, the contract must either be accessed from a single specific thread, or be able to operate in a multithreaded environment and resolve potential incompatibilities between interactions that happened at the same time in compatible blocks of different threads. The blockclique architecture as described in this work can be used to implement particular smart contracts that fit those constraints, such as Ethereum's ERC20. Fig. 4 . Example of a grandpa incompatibility in a block graph with 8 threads. In this example, the grandparent of block 14 is block 4, the grandparent of block 10 is block 1, the parent of block 14 in thread 1 is block 1 and the parent of block 10 in thread 4 is block 4. Equation 2 thus tells that there is a grandpa incompatibility between block 14 and block 10, so there is an edge in GGP I between blocks 14 and 10. This happened because the node that produced block 14 did not receive or take into account blocks 8 before creating block 14.
Appendix B Example Implementation of Transactions and Blocks with a Proof-of-Work Scheme
We give here a detailed implementation of the minimum data that must be stored in transactions and blocks to be able to validate transactions and apply the consensus rule, with a Proof-of-Work node selection mechanism.
B.1 Transactions
A transaction contains information about its version, the public key of its sender and its signature so that other nodes can verify the transaction, a fee value, an amount of coins transferred, a destination address, a timestamp and some optional data. Table 1 shows the different fields of a transaction. The minimum size of a transaction is 1040 bits (130 B) if there is no data provided, and the maximum size is 1072 bits. The VALUE field of a transaction specifies the amount of tokens that must be sent to the receiving address, with a minimum amount of 10 −8 tokens, and a maximum amount of (2 48 − 1) * 10 −8 = 2, 814, 749.76710656 tokens. The transaction fee is chosen by the sender of the transaction, like in blockchains such as Bitcoin or Ethereum, so that when the network is under high load, transactions with higher fees should be processed first in the interest of miners.
The TIMESTAMP field of a transaction specifies the time when the transaction was signed by the sender. This is used to avoid including the same transaction several times in a context where old blocks and old transactions are allowed to be forgotten. Miners do not include a transaction if it was signed too long ago (e.g. more than one hour before the block timestamp), as they don't know if it is already included in old forgotten blocks, e.g. years before.
The first transaction of the transaction list is called the coinbase transaction, and is used by the miner to claim the block reward. It has no FROM PK, FEE, or SIGNATURE fields, and its destination address is the miner's address.
The input address of the transaction defines the particular thread in which this transaction can be included, however the output address can be in any thread. We show an example with only one input address and one output address for clarity, although the thread constraint allows transactions to have multiple inputs from addresses of the same thread, and multiple outputs in any threads. List of transactions (see Table 1 ) assumed to be 1 MB here, resulting in a maximum of 7690 transactions of 130 B.
In our simulations, we used an older version of transactions, with a size of 127 B which gives 7872 transactions per block of 1 MB. The block hash function can be any secure hash algorithm. The hash is computed from the block header (from VERSION to N TRANSACTIONS field), and has 256 bits. Table 2 shows the different fields of a block. The first block of each thread is a genesis block, with a special status: it has no parents, so its PREV BLOCKS field is filled with zeros. Its NONCE and N TRANSACTIONS fields are also zeros (no transactions), its TARGET (see Sec. B.3) is chosen based on an estimate of the mining power of the network at launch, and its TIMESTAMP field is the time of the launch of the network.
A block is considered valid if it follows several rules. Its size must be under the maximum block size (1 MB). The target field must be computed based on the timestamps of the previous blocks (see Appendix B.3). The hash of the block must be under the target. The amount of the coinbase transaction must be the sum of the block reward (see Appendix B.4) plus the fees spent in this block. The PREV BLOCKS field must comply with the multithreaded block DAG properties (see Section 2.1). The transactions in the block must all be valid, meaning that the input address of each transaction must have a balance, after applying the ancestors of this block, larger than the total amount of coins spent by this address in this block. Finally, the root of the Merkle tree of the transactions in this block must be valid.
B.3 Mining Target
To mine a valid block, a miner has to find a nonce (number used once) that makes the 256 bits hash of the block be below a target threshold. The target threshold can be encoded as a floating-point number that can reach 2 256 with 32 bits, for instance with a 10 bits exponent and a 22 bits significand. To keep an average time t f 0 between two final blocks in each thread, the target for the current block being mined is updated at each block based on the number of blocks mined recently in all threads. The target is computed based on the timestamps of the last blocks in the time window in each thread including blocks until the parent of the current mined block in its thread, and potentially by removing 20% of the outliers so that inaccurate or fake timestamps have less incidence. The target of blocks can have any implementation as long as two thread incompatible blocks have the same target so that nodes cannot manipulate their block target by changing their block references, and it takes into account the block rate in all threads and is not specific to the block thread, in order to mitigate the potential attack of switching to a thread to mine until the target gets harder and then switching to an easier thread, which would be possible with a thread-specific target with Proof-of-Work.
B.4 Block Reward
We give a description of a possible reward scheme with an exponential decay and a bounded total supply (20, 000, 000 tokens), although any other reward scheme could be implemented, such as a reward scheme with a constant inflation rate. The block reward can be defined in each thread with a curve smoothly decreasing at each new block in the thread. For example, it can be implemented as an exponentially decreasing curve that halves every 10 years, so that 10, 000, 000 tokens are created during the first 10 years, 5, 000, 000 tokens are created from year 10 to year 20, etc. The reward of a genesis block is r 0 = 0, the reward of the first block after genesis is r 1 = 0.0438741, and then the reward for the n-th block in a thread is r n = r 1 × q n−1 with q = 0.99999993, and truncated at 10 −8 . The estimated total supply S(t) after time t (in seconds) is thus given by the sum of a geometric series in Equation 6 .
The reward of a miner for creating a block is composed of both the block reward plus the sum of the fees of all the transactions included in this block.
B.5 Node Synchronization
When a new node wants to join the network and synchronize with other peers, it can first download all the blocks from the peers. It cannot compute the maximal cliques of the whole block graph, so it directly computes the tip block (block without children) that has the maximum work in its ancestry. Then, the blockclique and some alternative cliques can be found by computing the cliques of only the most recent blocks: for instance the parents of the tip block of maximum work together with all their descendants. Starting with this blockclique and those alternative cliques, the node can use the incremental algorithm described in Section 2 from now on. If by any chance an alternative clique rooted in an older fork becomes the blockclique according to the other peers, the node will observe a tip block with maximum work in its ancestry that is not included in its blockclique, in which case it can restart this synchronization procedure: recompute the tip block with maximum work and the blockclique of the most recent blocks with respect to this tip block. If a node do not want to download and process the whole blockchain, it can download only the address-balance dictionary from a trusted node and the last blocks, or it can download the address-balance dictionary from an untrusted node and verify the hash of the address-balance dictionary with a trusted thirdparty. In [1] , blocks contain the hash of the address-balance dictionary. However, a real implementation of a blockclique network needs to be done to see if this approach scales to a high transaction throughput, where the address-balance dictionary hash would need to be recomputed multiple times per second, with each time about 8000 modifications in the dictionary.
Appendix C Resources Analysis
In this section we analyze the computing, network and storage resources requirements depending on the blockclique parameters and show that the high transaction throughput can be reached with fair individual node resources, and that with the blockclique architecture those three resources are more balanced than with the blockchain architecture.
C.1 Storage
The nodes contributing to the network need to store two main types of data: the blocks of transactions and the balance of addresses. At the average rate of one block per second, there are on average 31, 557, 600 blocks created per year. Block headers have a size of 175 B which makes 5.5 GB of headers per year, and the maximum size of transactions is 7, 998, 600 bits per block, which makes a maximum of 31.6 TB of transactions per year. Any node can store all block headers, but only some of the nodes will be able to store all block transactions. Therefore, nodes may only store the most recent blocks, and depending on their storage capacity, a random subset of the oldest blocks. For instance, a node with a standard storage capacity of 2 TB can store all block headers and 1% of 5 years of block transactions.
The addresses holding a non-zero balance are stored in an address-balance dictionary. The size of a balance can be 48 bits, which means that each address can hold a maximum of (2 48 −1) * 10 −8 ≈ 2, 814, 749 tokens. The size of an address is 160 bits, so each address-balance weighs 208 bits. We can thus store about 10 billions non-empty addresses with 260 GB, which is a reasonable number of addresses considering that each person or merchant can use the same address multiple times. Indeed, each output of a transaction has an optional 32 bits data field, which means that the receiver of a transaction (say a merchant selling a product) has a way to identify the sender (the client) by giving him a 32 bits identifier to put in the data field. The merchant can then change its address only once in a while for security or anonymity purposes. Also, to avoid spamming by creating a lot of new addresses with very small balances, we can add a constraint on transactions which states that a transaction cannot leave an input or output address with a non-zero balance lower than the fee of the transaction.
C.2 Computation
Each node has to perform some operations fast enough to keep up with the flow of transactions and blocks. For each block, the nodes must check that the hash of the block is below its target, which takes about 30 ms. Also, the ECDSA signature of each transaction must be verified, which takes about 100 us per transaction, and checking the balance of senders of transactions requires some database accesses (read: 1 us, write: 10 us), so a CPU with 4 cores can check 8, 000 transactions in about 250 ms. Finally, the blockclique must be updated for each new valid block, which takes on average 10 ms with F = 64. An average CPU can thus verify an average flow of 1 block of 8, 000 transactions per second.
C.3 Network Connectivity
Nodes are connected through a peer-to-peer network to share blocks and transactions with other nodes. Each node needs to download the blocks that are found by other nodes, with an average stream of one block per second (8 Mbps) in our example, plus new unconfirmed transactions in the thread where the node is mining, but those are small compared to the size of the blocks. Nodes also contribute to the network by sending block headers and block transactions to other peers that request them. If on average each node sends each block to one other peer, then nodes need at least 8 Mbps of upload bandwidth. However, for the network to synchronize quickly enough to keep the rate of stale blocks reasonable, the higher the average upload bandwidth of nodes the better. In the Bitcoin and Ethereum networks, the median upload bandwidth of nodes is estimated to 56.1 Mbps and 29.4 Mbps respectively [7] , and the median latency between nodes to 109 ms and 152 ms respectively. In our simulations we consider different conditions for the average upload bandwidth of miners: from medium speed (average of 32 Mbps) to fiber-level speed (average of 128 Mbps), and for the average latency: from an average of 50 ms to an average of 150 ms.
Appendix D Replay Attack: a Markov Chain Model
In this section we model an attack where a group of nodes decides to switch to a clique that is F −1 blocks behind the blockclique. We assume that attackers have a total proportion of mining/staking power p, that the stale rate is s, and that nodes observe all blocks immediately without latency, such that when a block is created, all nodes will have the same blockclique and alternative cliques, and a global state can represent the number of blocks an alternative clique is behind the blockclique for all nodes. Fig. 5 shows a Markov chain model representing this global state of an alternative clique with respect to the blockclique. We assume that we start in state 1 − F , meaning that the alternative clique is F − 1 blocks behind the blockclique. When the alternative clique becomes F blocks behind the blockclique (state −F ), it is removed and cannot compete with the blockclique anymore (absorbing state). When it gets the same size as the blockclique (state 0), then honest nodes, with (1 − p)(1 − s) effective power, will either extend the alternative clique which will become the new blockclique and at some point be F blocks ahead of the previous blockclique (in absorbing state F ), or extend the blockclique so that the alternative clique goes back 1 block behind.
We reorder the states of the Markov chain in the order (1 − F ), · · · , (F − 1), −F , F , and write the transition matrix P as a function of Q, the probability of transitioning from a transient state to another and R, the probability of transitioning from a transient state to an absorbing state. Also, we call N the fundamental matrix, giving the expected number of times the chain is in a state j given that it started in state i, which is the sum for all k of the probability of transitioning from i to j in exactly k steps:
Finally, B = N R is the probability to be absorbed in each absorbing state starting from a transient state i. Fig. 6 shows the probability to overtake the blockclique (to be absorbed in state F ) starting from 1 − F .
Appendix E Simulation Methods

E.1 Peer-to-peer Network
In our simulations, the peer-to-peer network is generated as a directed graph of N nodes with random connections between peers. Each node has a particular upload bandwidth u for sending blocks, randomly sampled at the beginning of the simulation between 1 2 U and 3 2 U where U is the average upload bandwidth of all nodes, and sends blocks one by one sequentially at the maximum speed of its upload bandwidth, and with a random latency depending on the destination node. The latency between two nodes is sampled at the beginning of the experiment between 0 ms and 2L where L is the average latency between two nodes of the network. Each node is connected to a number of random successors s that depends on its upload bandwidth u: s = u/8 with u in Mbps. If by this random process one of the nodes has no predecessors, we also connect this node to its successors both ways, so that all nodes have at least one predecessor.
We implement the trick described in [4] : when a node discovers or receives a block, it first proposes the block to each of its connected peers before verifying the block, by sending a message (again through a connection with the given latency). The node then verifies the block and its transactions before forwarding the block to its successors. Those verifications are simulated in the sense that we only compute the time needed for the node to verify the block and the transactions. The block verification time is 50 ms, and the transaction verification time is 0.025 ms per transaction included in the block. Then, when a node receives the message saying that a block is available, if this node never asked for this block, it does now by sending back a message asking for the block (with again some latency). Finally, when a node receives a message from a successor asking for a block, it adds the request to its sending queue and it will send the block when its connection is available.
We also implement other small optimizations: when a node receives a block, it informs its successors only when its sending queue is almost cleared, so that those successors have a chance to ask the block to another node that is readier to send, and a node preferentially sends the blocks it created versus blocks of other nodes.
Each event in this network, such as the reception of a block or of a message is included in an event queue ordered by the timestamp of the events. The main simulation loop consists in processing the network events one by one, by adding new events into the queue when a new message or block is sent, and by updating the blockclique from the point of view of the node that receive a block.
E.2 Threads and Mining
Each node is assigned to a particular thread to mine new blocks, based on its identifier, so that exactly N T nodes are assigned to each thread, although in a realistic PoW setting, miners would by default mine in a random thread and change thread randomly from time to time. We assume here that each node has the same constant mining power, and we do not simulate the actual mining algorithm nor the target hash to reach. We simulate mining by computing the time when each node will find a block with an exponential law of scale β = t v 0 ×N T so that one block is discovered on average every t v 0 seconds in each thread, although in reality we would specify t f 0 and adapt block targets to achieve it. To save memory in this simulation, the blocks are stored once in a global dictionary, but each node processes those blocks only when received. Nodes also forget all the old blocks that are now useless to them: their block graph G is kept as incremental as possible although in reality nodes could store as much blocks as their storing space would allow.
To speed up the simulation, we separate the processing of blocks by the mining nodes into T parallel processes based on the thread number, that communicate by sending blocks and other information through Python pipes.
E.3 Transactions and Blocks
We also simulate one transaction pool per thread, shared between nodes of the same thread: when a node receives a block, it updates the blockclique and looks at the transaction pool of its thread for how much unconfirmed transactions are available based on its new block references. At this point we update the number of transactions in this pool based on a Poisson distribution of parameter λ = t×T L T where t is the time elapsed since the last update of this pool, and T L is the transaction load: the average total number of transactions observed per second in all threads, which we set in the following experiments at T L = 800 or T L = 8000 transactions per second.
The maximum size of a block BS depends on the number of threads T and the time t v 0 between two blocks in each thread, so that about 8000 transactions per second can be included in blocks: BS = 8,000,000×t v 0 T bits. The size of a block header, BHS, is 376 bits plus the size of the PREV BLOCKS field, so BHS = 376+ T ×32. The maximum number of transactions per block is thus T P B = BS−BHS T S , where the size of a transaction is assumed here to always be T S = 1016 bits. For instance, with T = 32 and t v 0 = 32 seconds, we simulate a block size of 1 MB, and the maximum number of transactions per block is 7872.
Appendix F Simulation Results
We carry out several experiments to study the influence of different factors on the efficiency of the blockclique architecture. We vary the blockclique structure parameters (number of threads, time between two blocks), the network connectivity (bandwidth, latency), the network size (number of nodes), and we simulate the imbalance attack. We measure the average transaction throughput, block stale rate and transaction confirmation time for the duration of the simulations.
F.1 Structure Parameters
In a first experiment, we vary the number of threads T between 16 and 64 threads, the time between blocks t v 0 between 16 s and 64 s, the block size between 2 Mb and 32 Mb as a function of T and t v 0 so that about 8000 transactions per second can be included in blocks, and the average upload bandwidth U between 32 Mbps and 64 Mbps. The finality parameter F is set to 64 blocks, and the transaction load to T L = 8000 tx/s. We simulate here a network of 1024 nodes starting from T genesis blocks and until 3600 blocks are created in total. We run 10 trials of each condition by seeding the network random generation with the trial number so that 10 different random peer-to-peer networks are simulated. We also seed the numpy instances of the T Python processes with a combination of the trial and thread numbers.
The average transaction throughput is the number of transactions included in total in the blockclique after 3600 blocks created, divided by the time elapsed in seconds. Fig. 7 (top) shows the average and standard deviation over trials of the average transaction throughput, depending on the number of threads T , the time between blocks t v 0 , and the average upload bandwidth of nodes U (left: U = 32 and right: U = 64 Mbps), with an average latency between nodes of L = 100 ms.
First, we can see that the average transaction throughput increases with the average upload bandwidth of nodes, for all combinations of T and t v 0 . For example, with T = 32 threads and t v 0 = 32 s, the average throughput is 6285 tx/s and 6997 tx/s for respectively U = 32 and 64 Mbps. Also, with U = 32 Mbps, the average throughput increases with the number of threads from T = 16 to T = 64, whereas for U = 64 Mbps, the average throughput is similar with T = 32 and T = 64. Finally, the average transaction throughput increases with the time between two blocks t v 0 , for any combination of T and U . The average block stale rate is the proportion of blocks that are not included in the blockclique, computed after the creation of 3600 blocks. Fig. 7 (middle) shows the average and standard deviation over trials of the average block stale rate in the same experiments, depending on the number of threads T , the time between blocks t v 0 , and the average upload bandwidth of nodes U , with L = 100 ms.
First, the stale rate decreases with the average upload bandwidth of nodes, for any combination of T and t v 0 . For example, with T = 32 threads and t v 0 = 32 s, the average stale rate is 19.4%, and 8.9% for respectively U = 32 and 64 Mbps.
The average stale rate also decreases with the time between two blocks t v 0 for any combination of T and U , and with the number of threads for any combination of t v 0 and U . The average stale rate is negatively correlated with the average transaction throughput: the lower the stale rate, the higher the transaction throughput. However this is not a perfect correlation, as we can see for instance by comparing Fig. 7 (b) and (d) , for example with t v 0 = 64 s: the average transaction throughput with T = 32 and T = 64 blocks is respectively 7107 tx/s and 7087 tx/s, whereas the average stale rate is respectively 7.5% and 4.2%. This can be due to a different size distribution of the stale blocks depending on the number of threads T : the size distribution of stale blocks can be more skewed towards larger blocks with T = 64 than with T = 32, so that the transaction throughput can be higher with T = 32 threads while the block stale rate is also higher.
The average total transaction time is the time needed for a new transaction to be included in a block, plus the confirmation time: the time for this block to become a final block. We assume here that the blocks are not saturated so that there is no waiting queue for transactions. When a transaction is broadcast to the miners in the thread of this transaction, we assume that miners take this transaction into account as soon as they receive a new compatible block, which takes on average t f 0 /T seconds, and create a block that will become final and that includes this transaction after an average time t f 0 . Then, the time needed for this block to become final, which we call the confirmation time, is measured for each final block and averaged. Fig. 7 (bottom) shows the average over trials of the average total transaction time in the same experiments, depending on the number of threads T , the time between blocks t v 0 , and the average upload bandwidth of nodes U , with L = 100 ms. We also plot with a shaded area the average over trials of the standard deviation over transactions of the total transaction time due to the variability of the time for a new transaction to be included in a final block (estimated) and the variability of the confirmation time of a block (measured). First, the total transaction time decreases with the average upload bandwidth of nodes, for any combination of T and t v 0 . For instance, with T = 32 threads and t v 0 = 32 s, the average total transaction time with U = 32 Mbps is 126 s with a standard deviation of 41 s, and with U = 64 Mbps is 110 s with a standard deviation of 36 s. This is due to the fact that with a better network connectivity, the stale rate is lower and blocks become final faster because they get more than F descendants in at least one clique faster (see Sec. 2.3). Also, if the number of threads T increases, other things held constant, then the number of blocks discovered per second gets higher, and so the time needed for a block to become final gets lower, but the standard deviation do not decrease much because it is mainly due to the time needed for the transaction to be included in a block. Finally, the higher the time between blocks t v 0 , the higher the average total transaction time and its standard deviation, because the time needed for a transaction to be included in a block that will become final is on average
F.2 Bandwidth and Latency
In a second experiment, we study the variation of the average transaction throughput and block stale rate with respect to the average bandwidth and latency between two nodes in the peer-to-peer network. We vary the average latency L between 50 ms and 150 ms and the average upload bandwidth U between 32 and 128 Mbps, with the other parameters held constant: T = 32 threads, t v 0 = 32 s, N = 1024 nodes. With a given average latency L, the particular latency chosen to send blocks and messages from one node to another is randomly sampled between 0 and 2L at the beginning of the trial. We run 10 trials of each condition. Fig. 8(left) shows the average transaction throughput, block stale rate and transaction time depending on the average latency L and the average upload bandwidth U .
First, as before, the average transaction throughput increases and the average block stale rate decreases with the average upload bandwidth U , for any average latency L. Also, if the average latency increases from L = 50 ms to L = 150 ms, then the average transaction throughput slightly decreases with U = 32 and 64 Mbps and stays similar with U = 128 Mbps, and the average stale rate slightly increases for any U . For instance, with an average upload bandwidth U = 32 Mbps, the average throughput decreases from 6361 tx/s to 6165 tx/s, and the average stale rate increases from 17.7% to 20.6%. The average transaction time slightly increases with the average latency and decreases with the average upload bandwidth.
F.3 Network Size
In a third experiment, we study the variation of the average transaction throughput and block stale rate depending on the network size, for several average upload bandwidth U . Here we keep other parameters constant, with T = 32 threads, t v 0 = 32 seconds, L = 100 ms. We also run 10 trials of each condition. Fig. 8(right) shows the average transaction throughput, block stale rate and transaction time depending on the number of nodes in the network, from 256 nodes (8 nodes per thread), to 4096 nodes (128 per thread).
Here again, the average transaction throughput increases and the average stale rate decreases with the average upload bandwidth. For instance, with 1024 nodes, the average throughput with U = 32, 64 and 128 Mbps is respectively 6285 tx/s, 6997 tx/s and 7232 tx/s, and the average stale rate is respectively 19.4%, 8.9% and 5.2%. Then, the average transaction throughput decreases and the average stale rate increases with the number of nodes. For instance, with U = 32 Mbps and with a number of nodes of 256, 512, 1024, 2048, and 4096 the average throughput is respectively 6750 tx/s, 6456 tx/s, 6285 tx/s, 6105 tx/s, and 5923 tx/s, and the average stale rate is respectively 12.9%, 15.8%, 19.4%, 20.7% and 23.6%. The average transaction time increases with the number of nodes and decreases with the average upload bandwidth.
F.4 Imbalance Attack
In this experiment, we study the imbalance attack where one miner with a fair proportion of the total mining power decides to mine in only one thread instead of dividing its mining power into several threads at the same time or switching between threads from time to time, granting himself a large majority of the mining power in this particular thread.
We vary the mining power proportion P A of the attacker with respect to the whole network from 0.5% to 20% across different simulations, while the rest of the mining power is divided between the other 1023 honest miners. The upload bandwidth of the attacker is set to 128 Mbps, and the average upload bandwidth of honest miners is 32 Mbps. The honest miners are balanced across threads and stay in their threads for the whole duration of the simulation. We also vary the blockclique structure parameters: the number of threads T from 16 to 64 threads and the time between two blocks t 0 from 16 s to 64 s when t 0 ≥ T . Finally, we control the load of transactions T L that appear in the transaction pools at each second, with a non-saturated level T L = 800 tx/s and a saturated level T L = 8000 tx/s. The average latency between two nodes of the network is L = 100 ms. We run 20 trials for each combination of P A , T , t v 0 and T L, and each trial lasts until 3600 blocks are created.
We measure the rate of final blocks as the number of final blocks mined per hour and per percentage of the total mining power, and the rate of final transactions as the number of transactions included in final blocks per second and per percentage of the total mining power. We average this measure for three groups of miners: the attacker (1 miner), the honest miners in the same thread of the attacker (31 miners), and the honest miners in the other threads (992 miners).
We also compute the rate of final blocks and of final transactions of a miner that would have used a random mixed strategy: mining with the same power in each thread or mining in one thread but randomly changing thread with a sufficient frequency. Those rates are computed as a weighted average of the rate of the miners in the same thread as the attacker (with weight 1) and the rate of the miners in other threads (with weight T − 1). Fig. 9 shows the average and standard deviation over 20 trials of the rate of final blocks mined per hour and per percentage of mining power for the attacker, the miners in the same thread as the attacker, the miners in other threads and the miners that would have used a random mixed strategy, depending on the attacker mining proportion P A being 0.05%, 1%, 3%, 10% or 20%, and the structure parameters, with a non-saturated level of transaction load T L = 800 tx/s. Fig. 10 shows the rate of final blocks with a saturated level of transaction load T L = 8000 tx/s. Fig. 11 and 12 show the rate of final transactions with a non-saturated transaction load T L = 800 and with a saturated transaction load T L = 8000 tx/s. The standard deviation is higher for miners of the same thread as the attacker because they are fewer and thus mine less blocks than miners of the other threads, and the standard deviation for the attacker is higher when P A is low because it mines fewer blocks.
First, for all tested combinations of T and t v 0 , the rate of final blocks of miners staying in other threads and of miners in the mixed strategy slightly increases or stays similar when the attacker's proportion of mining power P A increases. For instance with T = 32 threads and t v 0 = 32 s, Fig. 9 shows that with P A being 3%, 10% and 20%, the rate of final blocks of miners in other threads is respectively 33.6, 33.8 and 33.9 b/h when T L = 800 tx/s, and Fig. 10 shows that it is 28. Also, the rate of final blocks of the attacker is similar to or slightly above the one of the miners in the mixed strategy when T L = 800 tx/s, and significantly higher when T L = 8000 tx/s. However, the rate of final blocks of miners in the same thread as the attacker gets significantly lower than the one of the miners in the mixed strategy when P A increases to 20%, for any T , t v 0 and T L. . We simulate here a network of 1, 024 nodes starting from T genesis blocks and until 3, 600 blocks are created in total. The average latency between nodes is L = 100 ms. The finality parameter is set to F = 64 blocks. We run 10 trials of each condition with different seeds. 
